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Abstract 
Perhaps, it would sound profoundly erroneous to assumed a status quo of privatisation as a Post-mortem perspective 
considering that the scheme is largely incomplete. The current trends in the debate revealed no claim to reject the fact 
that there has been an insufficient initiative by the government of Cameroon to expedite the transfer of ownership of 
nationalised corporations as prescribed by the presidential ordinance of 1990 and 1994. In the midst of these diverse 
political and economic motivations, government resentment to privatise has been interpreted from varied standpoints. 
One thing is clear, privatisation in Cameroon has suffered unprecedented setbacks which perhaps has not only limited 
government participation in economic activities but is behind the policy objectives lines.This study is seemingly first of 
it kind to address the notion of ownership consciousness as a product of the dismal fiscal and structural outcomes of the 
privatisation process in Cameroon.With the used of multiple regression analysis, the results are statistically conclusive 
that changes in ownership of nationalised industries have not yet led to any significant fiscal gain both in the short-term 
and long-term perspective, but there is an overwhelmed influence by Private foreign investors as oppose to the much 
needed indigenised ownership in the appropriation of property rights in the privatised sector of Cameroon economy . 
Keywords: Cameroon, Indeginised Ownership, Ownership Consciousness and Property rights 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Emerging Issues 
If privatisation is the language of capitalism, then the novel economic order of private sector supremacy is the policy 
style on which contemporary economic system is anchored. Perhaps it is not strange to construe that privatisation is the 
„holy grail‟ of free market economy, and the proposition of the Washington concensus on which the policy was 
fashioned is no longer a blueprint economic convention.There is a widespread understanding around the idea that the 
International Monetary Fund is currently perceived by many as a problematic institution. Evidence of lack of 
confidence from quite different perspectives including its intellectual orientation, and as well as the quality of its policy 
endorsements made to most developing economies are inevitably questionable (Frenkel, 2007).  
At the time when Cameroon gained it political independence, the country was found facing an economy wherein 
industrial development was discouraged (Nzomo & Nzongang, 2007). Over decades thereafter, major economic policies 
have practically evolved basically from import restrictions to price controls, and the participation of the new deal 
government in industry and commerce with the prospect of building a self-reliance economy (Hinman, 1994). The 
independent Cameroon created over 171 public enterprises funded mainly by government institutions such as the 
National Social Insurance Fund (CNPS), National Investment Fund (SNI) and the National Hydrocarbon Company 
(SNH) (Konings, 2004).  
Until the dawn of 1970 economic growth was consistent at about 5% per year in real terms (Tedonkeng, 2008). The 
twin effects of the petroleum boom between 1977/1978 and 1985/1986, together with the increased in exports of 
agricultural produce steered the economy to grow at an average of 7% per year (Awung & Atanga, 2011). With such 
great economic success stories, the country was portrayed as a model of Post-colonial independent economic 
powerhouse in Sub-Sahara Africa (Nzomo & Nzongang, 2007).  
In all, nationalised corporations created by the government were active in major areas of the economy as shown below:  
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Table 1. Cameroon Public Sector 
YEAR OF CREATION NAME OF COMPANY ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES/SECTOR 
1978 CAMTEL TELECOMMUNICATION 
1976 CNPS SOCIAL SECURITY 
1982 SONARA OIL AND GAS EXPLOITATION 
1980 SNH HYDROCARBON 
1999 TRADEX PETROLEUM DISTRIBUTION 
2004 CAMPOST MAIL DELIVERY 
1977 CREDIT     FONCIER          MORTGAGE FINANCE 
1952 SIC REAL ESTATE 
1977 MAETURE LAND DEVELOPMENT/MANAGEMENT 
1974 SODOCOTON COTTON PRODUCTION/EXPORT 
1947 CDC TEA, PALMS, BANANA PRODUCTION 
1965 CICAM TEXTILE MANUFACTURING 
1974 SODECAO COCOA PRODUCTION 
2006 CAMAIR-CO AIRLINE 
1957 ALUCAM ALUMINIUM 
1963 CIMEMCAM CEMENT PRODUCTION 
1987 CRTV RADIO AND TELEVISION 
1986 SONEL ELECTRICITY 
1973 SNEC WATER 
1975 HEVECAM RUBBER 
1975 CAMSUCO SUGAR 
1976 FEICOM MUTUAL FUND 
1969 IMPRIMERIE NATIONALE NATIONAL PRINTING PRESS 
1977 
1981 
CEPER 
ONDAPB 
EDITING AND PRINTING 
ANIMAL HUSBANDRY 
1975 SOFIBEL FOREST EXPLOITATION 
1966 
1984 
1975 
COCAM 
SCDM 
CHOCOCAM 
FOREST EXPLOITATION 
METALLIC PRODUCTS 
PROCESSED FOOD 
1971 SEPBC EXPLOITATION OF WOOD PRODUCTS 
1975 SOCAMAC TRANSPORT AND "ACCONAGE 
1968 SEAC MERCEDES REPRESENTATIVE 
   
Source: Cameroon Institute for National Statistics 
Events that led to the plummet in prices of major export products hastened the prominent 1986 financial crises 
(Tchoungui et al., 1995). Direct government subsidies to nationalised corporations soared to over 150 Billion FCFA in 
1984, and the sequence of colossal spending continued to rise tremendously (Hinman, 1994). 
The state of affairs evolved to the enactment of privatisation as a proposed panacea for the country‟s economic malaise 
which was very much similar to most developing economies of the Sub-Sahara economic region at that time (Kikeri & 
Nellis, 2004). The policy of denationalisation was fashioned as a cornerstone of IMF lending criteria. It became a 
precedence with no exemptions as governments of most countries were forced to accord to IMF fiscal plan to secured 
financial assistance (Bouin, 1992). Supporting evidence of denationalisation indicated that any prospect of structural 
reform of State corporations without a change in the composition of ownership would be ineffective, and meaningless 
(Williamson, 1990; Berthélemy et al., 1994).Despite the massive turnaround of the ownership structure of the 
Cameroon public sector, the cumulative nature of Public sector debts, fiscal deficit and anaemic private sector 
investment are distinctive symptoms of the floundering features of the economy under the dominant influence of private 
sector ownership.  
The impacts of privatisation in Cameroon remained largely unanswered and the anticipated private sector-led growth 
assumptions as suggested by the advocates of the bespoke policy of denationalisation have lost it overrated brilliance 
(Konings, 2003). The ultimate question requiring straightforward answers relate to the effectiveness of the policy 
instrument as the country is still under pressure to expedite the privatisation of the remaining nationalised corporations 
as endorsed by the IMF and the World Bank. The present-day statistics of Cameroon clearly depicts that public sector 
debts, fiscal deficits and unemployment are unprecedentedly high despite growth in real GDP. The question of the 
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effectiveness of IMF policy tool of privatisation is apparently inevitable as the country still struggles to balance its fiscal 
equations both in the short term and long term periods. 
Table1. Real GDP growth-Cameroon Economic Outlook 
YEAR 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
REAL 
GDP 
GROWTH 
4.5% 4% 4% 3.7% 2.3% 3.2% 3.3% 2.6% 2% 2.9% 4.1% 4.6% 
Source: Cameroonian authorities and IMF staff  
Table 2. Public Sector debts-Cameroon Economic Outlook 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Public debt 9.5% 10.6% 12.1% 12.9% 
Source: Cameroonian authorities and IMF staff reports  
Table 3. Fiscal deficit-Cameroon Economic outlook 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Fiscal deficit 2.3% -0.1% -1.1% -1.9% -3.9% 
Source: Cameroonian authorities and IMF staff reports  
The analysis of the problem of privatisation in Cameroon is based on key theoretical development including the 
well-thought stipulations of classical economics and free market system. The suggestions that ownership under the 
private sector is supreme to the public sector are just an indication that government ownership has no place in the 
contemporary economic system (Williamson, 1990). But, however, if the policy outcomes fall short of its objectives, 
then it is biassed to assumed that private sector ownership is a guaranteed for fiscal resilience. 
That notwithstanding, selected ideas from classical economists further heightened the concern that ownership could be 
distinguished between the principal and agent (Alchian & Demsetz, 1973). The proposition of agency theory is does 
considered significant when appraising ownership structure in public sector enterprises. Foremost in the debate on 
agency theory is the undulant relationship between the principal and the agents. The conflicting interests of stakeholders 
are the leading cause of agency problem (Hill & Jones, 1992).  
The application of agency theory in privatisation could be mirrored from three different positions. Firstly, an economy 
dominated by the private sector, secondly an economy dominated by the public sector, and lastly, an economy involving 
both private and public ownership. Taking the mix agency scenario as the starting point of the argument would mean the 
government and the private sector must act in a mutually corporative fashion by pursuing individual objectives and 
interest, but at the same time compromising on other stakeholders‟ interests to avoid conflicts of interests. 
1.2 Importance of the Problem 
The inconsistent fiscal position of Cameroon economy has necessitated a novel ideology to dichotomised the view that 
for privatisation to be effective, or perhaps considered optimal, then the supposition that both ownership structure and 
fiscal objectives should be prioritised bearing in mind that indeginised ownership is indispensable. In line with the 
aforementioned empirical substantiation, this study is aimed at analysing the effectiveness of privatisation in Cameroon 
in relations to the fiscal and structural impacts of the alteration of the ownership structure of nationalised industries. The 
intention of the researcher is neither to defend, nor to discard privatisation, but on the basis of statistics to highlight 
crucial macroeconomic components of the policy outcome of the paradigm.  
Although series of expedient academic research had been devoted to privatisation notably that conducted by (Nellis, 
2003; Berthélemy et al. 2004) mostly in the case of developing countries, it is worth mentioning that the context of the 
phenomenon has not been copiously uncovered in the case of Cameroon.Vital articles relating to the implementations of 
privatisation, and the performances of Cameroon public sector including those concluded by (Tchoungui et al. 1995; 
Konings, 1996, 2003; Nzomo & Nzongang, 2007) are empirically inadequate.The proposition of indigenised ownership 
is long forgotten in the bigger picture of the evaluation of privatisation within the aforementioned articles with specific 
reference to the Cameroon economy. 
This study is significant as it reveals a key aspect that would pioneer the driving force in the economic development of 
Cameroon as it suggests for the growth of indigenous investment would constitute the basis for creating an ethos of 
indigenous investments. 
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1.3 Propositions Of Privatisation 
Denationalisation as a policy tool was envisioned to restrain the rapid increase of government participation in public 
sector activities in Post-independence economies, with the intention to relieve the stress exerted by State-Owned 
Enterprises on public sector finance (Williamson, 1990).It was implemented as a strategy to encourage the growth of 
private sector investment in cooperation with indigenous entrepreneurs and foreign-based investors in Cameroon. The 
transfer of ownership became the nexus between the free market and capitalism as a cutting edge strategy to enhance 
private sector supremacy in developing economies. Nonetheless, considering the up-to-date economic outlook of 
Cameroon, it is evident to say that the expectations of the policy aftermaths are still far from completion. The growing 
concern of ownership consciousness is changing the paradigm of the transfer of ownership of public corporations to the 
private sector as many feels the policy objectives are far from being accomplished. 
The novel phase of ownership consciousness as part of the policy evolution is intended to disentangle problems caused 
by privatised companies such as market failures. Regardless of the sluggish pace of denationalisation by the 
administration of Cameroon, the IMF and World Bank still uphold their position that the transfer of ownership is a 
prerequisite to extricate Cameroon underachieving public corporations (Konings,2003). The reality of the huge shift of 
public assets to the private sector of over 48 nationalised industries in Cameroon is far from achieving the objectives of 
the policy. The relationship between privatisation and growth in private sector investment, fiscal deficit and public 
sector debts is of increasing concern as the government is still holding absolute ownership of vital public sector 
enterprises. 
1.4 Research Hypotheses 
Based on the paradox of privatisation as highlighted by (Kay & Thompson, 1986), the general statement of probability 
of this study can be construed to mean that privatisation has an adverse impact on public sector debts, fiscal deficit, and 
subsidies in Cameroon. It is consequently anticipated that the highlighted objectives of denationalisation are 
overwhelmed within the milieu of Cameroon economy as stated below.  
H1: Privatisation and the size of Cameroon public sector debt are positively related. 
H2: Privatisation and the size of public sector subsidies are directly related. 
H3: Cameroon public sector deficit would increase in the event of denationalisation. 
H4: Privatisation and indigenised ownership are inversely related 
2. Methodology 
2.1 Methodological Issues Involved 
In the history of structural adjustment analyses, there are profound methodological questions that need to be endured 
when considering venturing into assessing the effects of adjustment issues (Easterly, 2005). First, there is the 
counterfactual issue that highlights the question of what would have happened without adjustment? Another aspect is the 
„before and after‟ approach that assessed the impact of the reforms on economic performance before adjustments are 
made, and then compares them with Post-adjustment performance (Khan et al.,2011).The associated differences are 
often attributed to the effects of the adjustment programme of the implementing country. The „with‟ and „without‟ 
approach popularly known as Control group method involves comparing the performance of groups of adjusting 
countries to those of non-adjusting countries (Khan et al., 2011). The main problem with this approach is that there are 
variations in the actual adjustment packages and the reforms implemented by these countries (Ahmed & Lipton, 1997).  
Another impact using this approach is the concern that no two economies are the same as they would definitely response 
differently to the same adjustment package thus making the comparison process unfair. It is well-known that not all the 
implementing countries share a common socio-economic and political attributes. To a greater extent, this disparity 
determines the pace of acceptance and adoption of privatisation in most developing countries (Gore,2000; Berthélemy et 
al.,2004). The idea of using the counterfactual approach as a standardised analytical method is problematic considering 
that the macroeconomic variables are prone to changes that are largely unprecedented and inconclusive (Khan et al., 
2011). In the case of assessing the impact of privatisation in Cameroon, the counterfactual approach may not provide 
concise answers to the questions of the effectiveness of the policy outcome. Therefore, the question of what would have 
happened without adjustment becomes doubtful and bias.  
The understanding of the macroeconomic environment without adjustment is complex, and the used of assumptions to 
create a scenario of without adjustment may be based on predispositions which apparently are faulty. Further 
substantiation indicates that the economic environment is highly volatile and the risk of speculation may jeopardise the 
analysis. The researcher has no control over research variables and, therefore, the „with or without approach‟ is 
irrelevant to the study. The “before and after” approach unrealistically assumed that all else is equal which is prone to 
severe methodological problems (Bouin, 1992). Likewise, the problem of authenticity, relevant and accuracy of the data 
Applied Economics and Finance                                          Vol. 3, No. 1; 2016 
75 
 
collection always come up since this method relied upon historical data observed by someone other than the researcher 
(Daniel & Sam, 2010).  
The alternative method commonly used is the “without approach”. This method compares countries with adjustment 
programmes and those without any adjustment programmes (Khan, 2008).It assumed that countries requiring IMF plans 
were similar to countries that do not need them. It is based on doubtful assumptions mainly because selection bias may 
be involved in determining which countries require IMF programmes, and which countries do not need such structural 
reforms (Khan et al., 2011).The problem of such generalisation may be reflected in the heterogeneity of social and 
political discrepancy. In most cases, IMF programmes ignore to consider this disparity before the implementation of it 
economic plans.  
However, the most accurate way of evaluating the effectiveness of privatisation was proposed by World Bank.It involves 
comparing privatisation proceeds over time to observed GDP by the implementing countries (Clifton et al., 2003). This 
is preferred as a better indicator than using proceeds per inhabitant as it reflects huge differences in income per 
inhabitant. Another technique of evaluating privatisation is by examining the coefficient between the accumulated 
privatisation proceeds and the size of the public sector enterprise before the commencement of the privatisation process. 
But yet, the results are much more mixed and are partly explained by financial markets trends that make the assessment 
of privatisation based on proceeds quite challenging (Clifton et al., 2003).  
2.2 Methodological Design 
The most appropriate methodological design for this study is the concurrent approach. The premise that necessitate this 
plan is prompted by the proposition that the transfers of ownership of key public sector corporations in Cameroon are 
mostly incomplete. Cameroon is far behind the policy enforcement line of the privatisation of public enterprises.  
The statistical implications of this paradigm are that the results of the analysis are valid only within the specified period 
of the study, and it does not provide enough statistical suggestions to generalise the policy outcomes in relation to other 
countries that have implemented the model over the years.The intention of the researcher is to provide rooms for 
unexpected changes in economic and political decisions that may trigger either positive or negative changes in the 
results of the paradigm in the future.  
It is imperative to know that by the concurrent approach, results must be referred based on time and space. The validity 
of the analysis represents the period from 1994-2012 in the case of Cameroon. The concurrent approach provides a new 
perspective in assessing privatisation as a work-in-progress. Results of this nature indicate that conclusions are not finite, 
but most reflect elements of time and place. The propositions of the concurrent model deviate from the generalisation in 
both longitudinal and cross-sectional fashion. What works in one country may not work for others or, what works today 
may not work tomorrow. Such understanding is prudent and provides a base for policy argumentation. 
Taking into consideration the above methodological differences, the IMF policy of privatisation in the case of Cameroon 
is measured by statistically testing Privatisation proceeds and Private sector taxable revenue with specific reference to 
Public sector subsidies, Public sector debts and Public sector deficits using the econometric tool of multiple regression 
from 1994-2012.The expected outcomes of the statistical testing of research hypothesis provide point estimate that 
approximates the resulting impacts of the policy on the identified research variables as mentioned above. 
2.3 Description of the Analytical Technique Used. 
The conceptual framework of the study is interpreted to mean that the policy instruments of privatisation are essentially 
the leading cause of the country fiscal instability and the rising trends of public sector subsidies in Cameroon. The policy 
instrument of privatisation has not yet generated the expected benefits of private sector ownership over the 
underperforming dominance of public sector investments. Statistically, the above notion could be expressed as thus:  
The expression Y x; (y x) relates to the dependent and explanatory functions of the policy instrument of privatisation. 
This could be further symbolised in its simplest form as y = f (xi) representing a straight line function(s) of relationships 
between the cause-effects variables that could be interpreted as: Y= a + bx + e; Where a is an autonomous estimate,b is 
the linear coefficients of the function, e is the random error and term “x” represents the explanatory variable. The 
variable y in the equation represents the policy outcome of the adjustment programme that relates to the dependent 
variables under observation.  
The individual functional terms of the model are mathematically expressed as:  
GovS = βo + β1PP + β2PSTR + e………………………………………………………F (1) 
PSD = βo + β1PP + β2PSTR + e………………………………………………………...F (2) 
PSFD = βo + β1PP + β2PSTR + e ………………………………………………………F (3) 
Where;  
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PSD (Public sector debts) 
PSFD (Public sector fiscal deficit)  
GovS (Government subsidies)  
Based on empirical evidence, the most appropriate variables to comprehend the impact of privatisation on fiscal deficit 
and public sector debts would be expressing privatisation as Private sector taxable revenue (PSTR) and Privatisation 
proceeds (PP) in the period of privatisation based on the assumption that Privatisation proceeds and Private sector 
taxable revenue are both used in servicing Public sector debts and Public sector subsidies with specific reference to the 
Cameroon economy. 
3. Findings 
3.1 Structural Implications 
The fundamental question to be unravelled by this objective is anchored on the quest for indigenised ownership. The 
understanding of optimal ownership distribution is defined by the permutation of shares of former nationalised 
corporations to include Private foreign investors, Private local investors, and the Government of Cameroon. Resentment 
to privatisation has often been fueled by changes in the direction of ownership of public corporations.This may not 
necessarily have a direct economic or intellectual impact but could pose profound influence on the ideological 
perception of the policy framework as changes in ownership would compromise nationalistic feelings (Bethelemy et al., 
2004). The debacle of ownership paradigm in privatisation lies in the depth of property rights and agency theories. The 
ownership structure and motive of privatisation varied, and there are no standard approaches to defining the brilliance 
of economic and development strategies (Stiglitz, 1998). 
To a significant extent, denationalisation determines the destination of the economy as a whole. By implication, an 
economy dominated by Public sector ownership would strengthen the controlling interest of the government while, 
Private ownership superiority would means significant powers would be given to the private sector, and would 
influence the way the economic works. Agency theory suggests that agents have multifarious objectives and interests 
that often result to the agency problem due to conflict of individual stakeholders‟ interests (Alchian & Demsetz, 1973). 
The excessive influence of the private sector has always been a potential threat to government participation in industry 
and commerce, and the rise in ownership consciousness by indigenous investors. 
The impression of indigenised ownership emerged from the proposition of ownership consciousness influenced by the 
inadequacy of indigenous participation in the privatisation process of nationalised industries in Cameroon. It is aimed at 
giving indigenous entrepreneurs and the local government the edge in the ownership and control priority over foreign 
investors to narrow foreign supremacy over domestic ownership. The supposition of indigenisation is in no way aimed 
to restrain private sector investment, but to ensure that the sum of government ownership and local entrepreneurs‟ 
participations surpasses the proportion of foreign ownership in the privatised sector of Cameroon economy. 
 
Figure1. Structure of indigenous ownership 
Source: Author‟s postulation 
Notwithstanding, empirical evidence of the nomenclature of privatisation in Cameroon is as shown in the table below: 
Table 4. Nomenclature of privatisation in Cameroon 
YEAR COMPANY Activities  Gov. of Cameroon 
(%) 
Private Local 
ownership (%) 
Private Foreign 
ownership (%) 
1991 OCB/OSB Agro-industrial 0 30 70 
1991 CHOCOCAM Cocoa industry 0 25.3 74.7 
1998 CAMSUCO Agro-industrial  0 0.05 98.1 
1999 SOCAPALM Agro-industrial 10 90 0 
1993 CAMSHIP Container terminals 0 41 51 
1998 CEPER Printing and publication 0 100 0 
1992 ONDAPA/YAOUNDE Poultry 0 66 34 
1974 SODECOTON Cotton 59 41 0 
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Source: Cameroonian authorities and IMF staff reports 
Based on the above structure of privatisation, the following proportion of ownership is appropriated accordingly. 
Table 5. Appropriation of ownership structure 
Government of Cameroon Private local investors Private foreign investors 
14.9% 27% 58.1% 
Source: Author‟s estimate 
The aforementioned tabulations indicate that Private foreign investors dominate ownership of over 58% of Cameroon 
privatised sector of the economy from 1994-2012, thereby making indigenous investors out of ownership priority.  
Following the sluggish response to debts sustainability, the privatisation of the country‟s major corporations are 
seemingly far from achieving their respective completion deadline targets and as such, the question of indigenised 
ownership is not only projecting a retardation in the policy enforcement, but the idea that more need to be done to 
address ownership priority and financial motive as a twin objectives of denationalisation within the Cameroon context. 
This result is significant as it portrays an alternative trajectory of privatisation to revamp the ethos of domestic 
investment rather than an absolute transfer of ownership which is indispensable in achieving the anticipated status of an 
emerging economy by 2035. 
3.2 Fiscal Impact 
3.2.1econometric Model of Regression Analysis  
The analysis of the impact of privatisation on public sector debts and fiscal deficit in Cameroon follows an econometric 
model of multiple regressions. As already highlighted, the policy proposition of privatisation relates to the claims by 
IMF-supported by the Washington consensus of 1990 (Williamson,1990). It assumed that the transfer of ownership of 
State-owned enterprises to the private sector was aimed to stimulate economic growth and enhanced a sound fiscal 
situation of the struggling economy.  
In other words, private sector investment is outstanding to the inferior government ownership (Berthélemy et al., 2004). 
The premise of this research is based on the postulation that the objective of fiscal stability of the transfer of property 
rights has been defeated in the case of Cameroon. The following review is the step-by-step procedure of the analysis of 
these claims. The research period under consideration is from 1994 to 2012. Key explanatory variables to ascertain 
these propositions include Privatisation proceeds (PP) and Private sector taxable revenue (PSTR) as shown below. 
 
 
 
 
1996 HEVECAM Agro-industry 10 0 90 
2001 SONEL-AES-SONEL  44 0 56 
2006 CAMWATER Water  100 0 0 
1987 CRTV Radio and television 100 0 0 
2004 CAMPOST Postal services 100 0 0 
1978 CAMTEL-FIXED Communication 100 0 0 
2006 CAMAIR-CO Airline transport 100 0 0 
1976 CNPS National social insurance 100 0 0 
1980 SNH Hydrocarbon 100 0 0 
1977 CFC Building society 100 0 0 
1957 ALUCAM Aluminium  46.7 0 53.3 
1963 CIMENCAM Cement 43 0 57 
1991 SOCAMAC Harbour Handling 53.51 0 51 
1991 SEPBE Forest Reserve 0 0 70 
1992 COCAM Plywood 0 0 87.6 
1994 SCDM Metallurgy 0 0 86.6 
1999 CAMRAIL Railways 13.5 5.3 81.2 
1998 BICEC Banking 17.5 7.5 61.22 
2001 CAMTEL-MOBILE Telecommunication 0 30 70 
1995 SPFS-SRL Agro-industrial 0 27.25 72.75 
1995 SOFIBEL Forestry  0 79.43 0 
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Table 5. Assessing the leveraging effects of privatisation proceeds on debts and subsidies 
Year  PROCEEDS 
Billion FCFA 
DEBT  
Billion 
FCFA 
LEVERAGE ON 
 DEBTS Billion 
FCFA 
SUBSIDIES 
Billion 
FCFA 
LEVERAGE ON 
SUBSIDIES Billion 
FCFA 
1994 0 152.7 -152.7 57 -57 
1995 1 633.0 -631 77 -76 
1996 22 74.8 -52.8 63 -41 
1997 1 n/a n/a 85 -84 
1998 
1999 
11 n/a n/a 100 -89 
79 302 -223 109 -30 
2000 0 339 -339 133 -133 
2001 0 917 -917 n/a n/a 
2002 2 914 -912 113 -111 
2003 0 313 -313 129 -129 
2004 8 285 -277 141 -133 
2005 0 4,534 -4.534 175 -175 
2006 0 1,489 -1,489 211 -211 
2007 0 1,171 -1,171 230 -230 
2008 0 1,015 -1,015 286 -286 
2009 0 1,114 -1,114 289 -289 
2010 0 1,349 -1,349 331 -331 
2011 0 1,663 -1,663 550 -550 
2012 0 2,085 -2,085 426 -426 
Source: Cameroon authorities, IMF staff and author‟s computation 
Table 6. Long-term leveraging effects 
YEAR 
OF 
TRANSACTIONS 
%TAX 
REVENUE 
BILLION 
FCFA 
TOTAL 
REVENUE 
BILLION 
FCFA 
TAX 
REVENUE 
BILLION 
FCFA 
PRIVATE 
SECTOR 
REV 
AS %PGFI 
BILLION 
FCFA 
PUBLIC 
 DEBT 
BILLION 
FCFA 
LONG TERM 
LEVERAGING 
EFFECTS 
BILLION 
FCFA 
1994 71.7 534 382.9 354.6 152.7 201.9 
1995 68.9 654 450.6 435.7 633.0 -198.7 
1996 65.3 723 472.1 441.9 74.8 367.1 
1997 68.1 863 587.7 519.5 N/A N/A 
1998 77.8 848 659.7 577.9 N/A N/A 
1999 64.7 1,092 706.5 646.4 302 344 
2000 72.5 1,110 804.7 709.7 339 370.7 
2001 66.2 1,220 807.6 694 917 -223 
2002 94.6 1,325 1,253.4 1,108 914 194 
2003 94.8 1,405 1,331.9 1,157.4 313 844.4 
2004 92.4 1,267 1,170.7 1,009.1 285 724.1 
2005 91.9 1,543 1,418 1,175.5 4,534 -3,359.5 
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2006 94.5 1,808 1,708.6 1,433.5 1,489 -55.5 
2007 13.8 1,867 1,236 9,71.5 1,171 -199.5 
2008 12.3 2,122 810 562 1,015 -453 
2009 12.7 1,839 1,331 1,020.8 1,114 -93 
2010 12.4 1,940 1,375 1,024 1,349 -325 
2011 12.9 2,250 1,551 1,039 1,633 -594 
2012 13.5 2,370 1,677 1,174.7 2,085 -910 
Source: Author‟s computation 
A. PUBLIC SECTOR SUBSIDIES: 
Analysis of the above figures using multiple regressions analysis shows the following outputs of the data set with 
specific reference to Public sector subsidies using Privatisation proceeds and Private sector taxable revenue as standard 
explanatory variables. 
Table 7. Regression output on subsidies 
  Coefficients Standard 
Error 
t-Stat P-value Lower 
95% 
Upper 
95% 
Lower 
95.0% 
Upper 
95.0% 
Intercept 14.09398 75.5757 0.186488 0.854406 -146.119 174.3073 -146.119 174.3073 
PRIV TAX 0.191114 0.081386 2.348234 0.032047 0.018583 0.363645 0.018583 0.363645 
PROCEEDS -0.59433 1.390662 -0.42737 0.674806 -3.5424 2.353746 -3.5424 2.353746 
The regression outputs for Public sector subsidies are statistically conclusive. It indicates that the proportion of the 
variability of subsidies caused by changes in Public sector taxable revenue, and Privatisation proceeds as represented by 
the coefficient of determination R Square is just 20% at the 95% confidence interval as shown in appendix A. This 
estimation specifies that Privatisation proceeds and Private sector taxable revenue can accurately explain only 20% of 
changes in subsidies within the period of analysis.  
The ‘good fit’ for the regression analysis according to regression output as contained in appendix A is 0.062 which is 
greater than the threshold of 0.05. Somehow, this compromises the accuracy of this regression model to ascertain the 
fact that Privatisation proceeds and Private sector taxable revenue do not satisfactorily explained the variability in 
Public sector subsidies. 
The significance of the regression analysis on Public sector subsidies resulted in the rejection of the claim by IMF that 
private sector investments are expected to generate enough revenue to lessen aggregate Public sector subsidies. 
Statistical computations present evidence to suggest that the privatisation of Cameroon public corporations has failed to 
reduce the size of the country public sector subsidies at P-value of 0.032. This analysis, therefore, agrees to the 
alternative proposition which correspond to the researcher's claim. The predictive analysis as established by the 
correlation coefficient of Private sector taxable revenue of 0.191 indicates that an increase by 1 billion FCFA of Private 
sector taxable revenue would lead to a rise by 191 million FCFA of Public sector subsidies considering that 
Privatisation proceeds are held constant. 
On the other hand, Privatisation proceeds are extensively insignificant at P-value of 0.67 to discard the claim that 
privatisation proceeds can lessen subsidies as shown in appendix A. However, this implies that we do not reject nor 
accept IMF proposition of Privatisation proceeds to enhance subsidies as the probability of this estimate is very 
insignificant to make statistical inference with regards to privatisation proceeds. 
B. PUBLIC SECTOR DEBTS (PSD): 
The next dependent variable in the analysis is public sector debts (PSD). The regression outcomes of the statistical 
inputs of the established data set for Public sector debts are as follows: 
Table 8. Regression outputs for Public sector debts 
  Coefficients Standard 
Error 
t-Stat P-value Lower 
95% 
Upper 
95% 
Lower 
95.0% 
Upper 95.0% 
Intercept -546.616 651.1447 -0.83947 0.413574 -1926.98 833.7493 -1926.98 833.7493 
PRIV TAX 1.839117 0.701208 2.622784 0.018465 0.352623 3.325611 0.352623 3.325611 
PROCEEDS -6.664 11.98166 -0.55618 0.58578 -32.064 18.73598 -32.064 18.73598 
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The variability in Public sector debts caused by changes in Privatisation proceeds and Private sector taxable revenue as 
indicated by the coefficient of determination R-square is just 35% (see appendix B).This means that Privatisation 
proceeds and Private sector taxable revenue can explain only 35% of the changes in Public sector debts at 95% 
confidence interval. The „good-fit‟ of the accuracy of this regression is significant as both Privatisation proceeds and 
Private sector taxable revenue accurately explained the variability of Public sector debts at 0.033.The significance of 
this regression indicates that Private sector taxable revenue is actively momentous to reject IMF claims that private 
sector investment can generate enough taxable revenue to offset Cameroon Public sector debts. 
Also, the coefficient of regression indicates that an increase by 1 Billion FCFA of Private sector taxable revenue would 
lead to a rise in Public sector debts by 1.839 billion FCFA. Meanwhile on the basis of Privatisation proceeds, the 
regression analyses of the variables indicate that Privatisation proceeds do not provide enough evidence to reject nor 
accept IMF claim that Privatisation proceeds can enhance Public sector debts. This implies that Privatisation proceeds 
are irrelevant at P-value of 0.58578 to dismiss the claim that Privatisation proceeds can improve Public sector debts.  
C. PUBLIC SECTOR DEFICIT: 
The final variable of our analysis is Public sector deficit. The regression outputs for public sector deficit represent the 
following: 
Table 9. Regression output for Public sector deficits 
  Coefficients Standard 
Error 
t-Stat  P-value Lower 
95% 
Upper 
95% 
Lower 
95.0% 
Upper 
95.0% 
Intercept -233.952 114.1161 -2.05012 0.05711 -475.867 7.963612 -475.867 7.963612 
PRIV TAX -0.00023 0.12289 -0.00188 0.998523 -0.26075 0.260284 -0.26075 0.260284 
PROCEEDS 3.264478 2.099841 1.554631 0.13959 -1.18699 7.715943 -1.18699 7.715943 
The variability of Public sector deficit that can be explained by Privatisation proceeds and Private sector taxable 
revenue is just 3%, and the „good-fit‟ of the regression is 0.302 as shown in appendix C. This suggests that the accuracy 
of the explanatory variable is highly inadequate to provide any concise meaning to the variability in public sector deficit. 
Yet, We cannot rely on Privatisation proceeds and Private sector taxable revenue as the best set of explanatory variables 
of Public sector deficit. The level of significance at 95% confidence interval for both Private sector taxable revenue and 
Privatisation proceeds are highly trivial at 0.998 and 0.139 of P-value.This does not provide statistical evidence to 
discard the claim that Privatisation proceeds and Private sector taxable revenue can reduce Public sector deficit.We can 
not accept or reject IMF claim on deficit reduction on the basis of regression statistics. 
4. Conclusion and Recommendations 
The Post-mortem analysis of privatisation agenda in Cameroon as revealed by this study indicate that the proportion of 
Private foreign ownership exceeds those of Private local and Government ownership in the privatised sector of 
Cameroon economy.The proposition of fiscal stability as indicated by the IMF failed the litmus test as privatisation 
proceeds is proven to be insignificant to enhance a healthy fiscal outlook of Cameroon economy. The claim of growth in 
private sector investment and its cumulative impact on private sector taxable revenue is proven to be ineffective making 
the country still indebted and fiscally fragile. It is no surprise to say the policy attempt of privatisation in Cameroon was 
entirely based on wishful thinking.The set pieces of the current fiscal situations are evidence.  
Following the sluggish response to debts sustainability, the privatisation of the country‟s major corporations are 
seemingly far from achieving their respective completion deadline targets, and as such the question of indigenisation is 
not only projecting a retardation in policy enforcement but the idea that more need to be done to address ownership 
priority and financial motive as twin objectives of denationalisation in the Cameroon context . Considering these 
statistical and empirical deductions, we recommend that the government of Cameroon should extend the privatisation 
agenda, but must provide for the participation of Local private investors and government ownership.The condition to 
encourage an ethos of local ownership must be supported by an increase in the investment in human capacity to be 
competitive. 
References 
Amed, I. I., & Lipton, M. (1997). The Impact of Structural Adjustment on Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: A Review of 
the Literature. Institute of Development Studies and Poverty Research Unit-IDS, Working Paper 62. Pp. 1-33. 
Alchian, A. A ., & Demsetz, H. (1973).The Property Right Paradigm. The Journal of Economic History, 33(1), 16-27. 
Amungwa, F. A. (2009). Appraisal of Privatisation of Agricultural Extension Services in Cameroon. Journal of 
Agricultural Extension and Rural Development, 1(3), 085-092.  
Awung, W. J., & Atanga, M. (2011). The Economic crisis and multiparty politics in Cameroon. Cameroon Journal of 
Democracy and Human Rights- CJDHR., 5(1), 94-127. 
Berthélemy, J. et al. (2004). Privatisation in Sub-Saharan Africa: Where Do We Stand? .Paris: Development Centre of 
Applied Economics and Finance                                          Vol. 3, No. 1; 2016 
81 
 
the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development-OECD. 
Bouin, O. (1992). The Privatisation in Developing Countries: Reflections on a Panacea. Brief, 3. Paris: Development 
Centre Policy OECD. 
Clifton, J. et al. (2003). Privatisation in the European Union: Public Enterprises and Integration. Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers.  
Daniel, S., & Sam, A. G. (2010). Research Methodology. Delhi: Kalpaz publication. 
Easterly, W. (2005). What Did Structural Adjustment Adjust? .The Association of Policies and Growth with Repeated 
IMF and World Bank Adjustment Loans, 76, 1-22. 
Frenkel, R. (2007). Current problems with the IMF and Challenges Ahead: A Latin American Perspective. FES briefing, 
December 2007, 16, 2-7. 
Gore, C. (2000). The Rise and Fall of the Washington Consensus as a Paradigm for Developing Countries. World 
Development, 28(5), 789-804,  
Hinman, D. L. (1994). Implementation of the World Bank's First Structural Adjustment Loan in Cameroon: A Case 
Study of Public Enterprise Reforms and Industrial and Commercial Reforms Decentralization: Finance and 
Management Project Associates In Rural Development, Inc. The United States Agency for International 
Development Mission to Cameroon Office of Economic Analysis and Policy Reform Implementation. 
Hutcheson, G. D. (2011). Ordinary Least-Squares Regression. The SAGE Dictionary of Quantitative Management 
Research, 224-228. 
Hill, C. W. L., & Jones, T. M. (1992). Stakeholders –Agency Theory. Journal of Management Studies, 29(2), 131-154. 
IMF Country Report. (2006). IMF Cameroon: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper .Third Annual Progress Report 
Washington DC: IMF Publication. 
International Monetary Fund. (2013). Cameroon 2013 Article IV consultation. IMF Country Report, Washington DC: 
International Monetary Fund Publication Services. 
 International Monetary Fund. (2006) .IMF Country Report No. 06/260 Cameroon: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. 
3
rd
 Annual Progress Report. Washington DC: IMF secretary department release. 
International Monetary Fund. (2012). Cameroon 2012 Article IV consultation IMF country report. 
no.12/237.Washington DC: IMF publication. 
International Monetary Fund. (2014). Factsheet of Cameroon economic profile. Washington. D.C: IMF Secretary‟s 
Department. 
Kay, J. A., & Thompson, D. J. (1986). Privatisation: A Policy In Search Of a Rationale. Economic Journal, 96, 18-32. 
Khan et al.(2011). Impact Evaluation of Structural Adjustment Program: A Case of Pakistan. European Journal of 
Economics, Finance and Administrative Sciences, 29, 52-62. 
Khan, J. A. (2008).Research methodology. New Delhi: APH Publishing Corporation. 
Kikeri, S., & Nellis, J. (2004). An Assessment of Privatisation. The World Bank Research Observer, 19(1), 87-118. 
Konings, P .(2003).Privatisation And Ethno-Regional Protest In Cameroon. Africa Spectrum, 38(1), 5-26. 
Konings, P. (1996). The Post-Colonial State and Economic and Political Reforms in Cameroon’, In A.E. Fernández 
Jilberto & A. Mommen (Eds), Liberalization in the Developing World: Institutional and Economic Changes In 
Latin America, Africa and Asia. London: Routledge. 
Konings, P. (1996). Privatisation of Agro-Industrial Parastatal and Anglophone Opposition in Cameroon. Journal of 
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 34, 199-217. 
Nellis, J. (2005). Privatisation in Africa: What has happened? What is to be done? Centre for Global Development. 
127(5), 1-44. 
Nellis, J. (2006). Back to the Future for African Infrastructure? Why state-ownership is no more promising the second 
time around. Working Paper No. 84.Washington DC: Centre for Global Development. 
Nzomo, J. T., & Nzongang, J. (2007). The process of privatisation of public and Para-public enterprises in Cameroon: 
An assessment. Journal of sustainable development in Africa, 9(4), 229-246. 
Stiglitz, J. E. (1998). More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving Toward the Post –Washington Consensus 
1998.UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research, 2, 1-39. 
Tchoungui et al. (1995).Structural Adjustment and Sustainable Development in Cameroon. Overseas Development 
Institute-ODI. Working Paper, 83, 1-130. 
Williamson, J. (1990). What Washington Means By Policy Reform. Peterson Institute for International Economics. 
 
 
 
 
Applied Economics and Finance                                          Vol. 3, No. 1; 2016 
82 
 
Appendix 
Appendix A: Summary Outcome Subsidies  
 
 
ANOVA       
  Df SS MS F Significance 
F 
 
Regression 2 73286.38 36643.19 3.315576 0.062418  
Residual 16 176829.3 11051.83    
Total 18 250115.7        
Appendix B: Summary Output for Debts 
  
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.588368 
R Square 0.346177 
Adjusted R Square 0.264449 
Standard Error 905.7586 
Observations 19 
 
ANOVA      
  Df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 2 6949980 3474990 4.235733 0.033395 
Residual 16 13126379 820398.7   
Total 18 20076358       
Appendix C: Summary Output for Deficit 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.372904 
R Square 0.139057 
Adjusted R Square 0.031439 
Standard Error 158.7384 
Observations 19 
 
ANOVA      
  Df SS MS F Significance 
F 
Regression 2 65118.38 32559.19 1.29214 0.301852 
Residual 16 403166.1 25197.88   
Total 18 468284.5       
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Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.541304 
R Square 0.29301 
Adjusted R Square 0.204636 
Standard Error 105.1277 
Observations 19 
